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SALES-A COMPARISON OF THE LAW IN WASHINGTON
AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
RICHARD COSWAY*
This article is a continuation of the analysis made by Professor
Ralph Johnson in an earlier issue of this Review' of the effect on
Washington law of article 2 (Sales) of the Uniform Commercial Code.
As such, it will continue the format there established of a section by
section analysis of the Code.
Section 2-204. Formation in General.
(1) A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner suffi-
cient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties
which recognizes the existence of such a contract.
(2) An agreement sufficient to constitute a contract for sale may be
found even though the moment of its making is undetermined.
(3) Even though one or more terms are left open a contract for
sale does not fail for indefiniteness if the parties have intended
to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for
giving an appropriate remedy.
A sale or a contract to sell partakes of much of the general law of
contracts, and subsection (1) states a generally recognized principle
that agreements can be reached by words or by conduct Of course,
this basic premise turns ultimately on factual inquiries concerning the
substance of such an agreement,' the identity of the parties to it,' and
the definition of the subject matter dealt with,' which turn on a deter-
mination of whether the parties have manifested an intention to be
bound by an agreement sufficiently definite to be enforced.'
* Professor of Law, University of Washington.
'Johnson, Sales-A Comparison of the Law in Washington and the Uniform Coln-
mercial Code, 34 WASH. L. REV. 78 (1959).
2 Campbell v. Webber, 29 Wn.2d 516, 188 P.2d 130 (1947) ; De Britz v. Sylvia, 21
Wn.2d 317, 150 P.2d 978 (1944); Pennington & Co. v. Hedlund Box & Shingle Co.,
116 Wash. 292, 199 Pac. 235 (1921) ; RCW 63.04.040; Shattuck, Contracts in Wash-
ington, 1937-1957, 34 WASH. L. Rav. 24, 27 (1959).
3 Inland Nay. Co. v. McGrady, 43 Wn.2d 209, 260 P.2d 893 (1953) ; Jones v. Mallon,
3 Wn.2d 382, 101 P.2d 332 (1940) (record does not show what parties meant by "money
back guarantee") ; International Lumber Export Co. v. M. Furuya Co., 121 Wash. 350,
209 Pac. 858 (1922) (uncertain which of two measurement methods was to be used).
4 There is a surprisingly large number of decisions in which the dispute turns on
who sold to whom, usually raised as a defense by one claiming that he was not the
purchaser, that he was acting for someone else. Marble v. Feak, 31 Wn.2d 844, 199
P.2d 66 (1948) ; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Nilsen, 175 Wash. 237, 27 P.2d 128 (1933) ;
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Subsection (2) of the section under consideration deals with an all
too frequent situation in which the definiteness of the agreement is
rendered doubtful by what Professor Shattuck has called f'sheer gar-
rulity."' The section expresses a policy toward finding agreements
even though the precise time of closing is not certain; however, in-
evitably in such circumstances the likelihood is that if the time of
dosing is uncertain, the details of the proposed agreement are simi-
larly uncertain. The result may be no contract.8 Another section of
the Code? deals more explicitly with this problem.
The major contribution of this section is, of course, subsection (3)
which establishes the policy of enforcing agreements which leave one
or more terms open. This policy is implemented by specific sections
dealing with open price terms,10 undesignated place1 or time' of
delivery, and unspecified quantity, as in output and requirements con-
tracts."8 As will subsequently be seen, this abolishes, so far as the
sale of goods is concerned, certain classic verities of the law of con-
tracts, such as that an agreement to agree is no contract. " The broad
limitation of the statute, requiring a reasonably certain basis for rem-
Voelker v. Cleveland, 168 Wash. 38, 10 P.2d 561 (1932); Paysee Hardware Co. v.
Laurens, 156 Wash. 703, 286 Pac. 56 (1930) ; Porter v. Baretich, 153 Wash. 679, 280
Pac. 78 (1929); Deweese v. Charles C. Moore & Co., 113 Wash. 233, 193 Pac. 702(1920) ; Simon v. Saxony Knitting Co., 103 Wash. 148, 173 Pac. 1022 (1918) ; Hexter
v. Crown Woolen Co., 95 Wash. 348, 163 Pac. 774 (1917); State ex rel. Upper v.
Hanna, 87 Wash. 29, 151 Pac. 1087 (1915) ; First Nat!I Bank v. Geske & Co., 85 Wash.
477, 148 Pac. 593 (1915) ; Lovell v. Haye, 85 Wash. 109, 147 Pac. 632 (1915) ; Ander-
son v. White Co., 68 Wash. 568, 123 Pac. 1009 (1912) ; Sumner Iron Works v. Winkle-
man Lumber Co., 66 Wash. 14, 118 Pac. 886 (1911).
S Treadwell v. Kristoferson, Inc., 32 Wn2d 145, 200 P.2d 740 (1948) ; Forman v.
Columbia Theater Co., 20 Wn.2d 685, 148 P.2d 951 (1944) (What does "etc." mean?);
Puget Mill Co. v. Duecy, 1 Wn.2d 421, 96 P.2d 571 (1939) (Does the word "minerals"
include sand and gravel?) ; International Lumber Export Co. v. M. Furuya Co., supra
note 3; McVeety v. Hayes, 111 Wash. 457, 191 Pac. 401 (1920) ; Price v. Homburg,
101 Wash. 472, 172 Pac. 575 (1918).8 Kopp v. Paramount Prods. Corp., 50 Wn.2d 607, 313 P.2d 682 (1957) ; Excelsior
Knitting Mills, Inc. v. Bush, 38 Wn.2d 876, 233 P.2d 847 (1951) ; Moxee Co. v. Lloyd
L. Hughes, Inc., 24 Wn.2d 224, 163 P.2d 603 (1945) ; Pacific Food Prods. Co. v. Mukai,
196 Wash. 656, 84 P.2d 131 (1938) ; Parks v. Kirkland Packing Co., 172 Wash. 450,
20 P.2d 588 (1933) ; Garrison v. Anderson, 149 Wash. 281, 270 Pac. 802 (1928). The
basic dispute in many of these cases turns on whether a contract had been entered into
prior to the execution of a writing contemplated by the parties. See Shattuck, supra
note 2, at 34.
7 Shattuck, supra note 2, at 44.
8 Schulze v. General Elec. Co., 108 Wash. 401, 184 Pac. 342 (1919) ; Jones-Scott Co.
v. Ellensburg Milling Co., 108 Wash. 73, 183 Pac. 113 (1919) ; W. F. Jahn & Co. v.
McClaine, 97 Wash. 95, 165 Pac. 1060 (1917) ; See the cases cited supra note 6, and
Shattuck, supra note 2, at 45.
9 UNIFORM CoMERCiAL CODE § 2-207 (hereinafter cited only to the appropriate code
sections).
10 Section 2-305.
11 Section 2-308.
12 Section 2-309.
13 Section 2-306.
14 Section 2-305, official comment 1.
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edy, will be effective to keep the time-honored principle that an illu-
sory promise will not constitute the basis of a contract."5 On the other
hand, it will tend to cause a reexamination of some of the Washington
cases where no specific undertaking by one of the parties to a con-
tract was spelled out, but some obligation on his part was implicit in
the undertaking. 6 Where such an obligation is implicit in the agree-
ment, viewed from a commercial standpoint, it will be enforced.
Section 2-205. Firm Offers.
An offer by a merchant to buy or sell goods in a signed writing
which by its terms gives assurance that it will be held open is
not revocable, for lack of consideration, during the time stated
or if no time is stated for a reasonable time, but in no event may
such period of irrevocability exceed three months; but any such
term of assurance on a form supplied by the offeree must be
separately signed by the offeror.
15 Winslow v. Meli, 48 Wn.2d 581, 295 P.2d 319 (1956) ; Carolene Sales Co. v. Can-
yon Milk Prods. Co., 122 Wash. 220, 210 Pac. 366 (1922) (agreement to sell so much
as "purchaser might desire"). Seattle Seed Co. v. Fujimori, 79 Wash. 123, 139 Pac.
866 (1914) indicates the direction in which the Code may well be interpreted. The
court was unable to find a contract when negotiations did not specify price, quantity
or terms, but was able to enforce one which omitted only a statement of kind or quality.
In the words of official comment to section 2-204: "The more terms the parties leave
open, the less likely it is that they have intended to conclude a binding agreement, but
their actions may be frequently conclusive on the matter despite the omissions."
16 In Mowbray Pearson Co. v. E. H. Stanton Co., 109 Wash. 601, 187 Pac. 370
(1920) the defendant sent this letter to the plaintiff: "In consideration of [plaintiff's]
soliciting and delivering ice in [a designated area in Spokane, the defendant] agrees to
sell pure merchantable ice to [the plaintiff] for $1.50 per ton at their plant for their
[the plaintiff's] requirements during 1916, and further agrees not to sell to any other
dealer for distribution in that district." The plaintiff wrote "Accepted" thereon. Held,
since this was a promise only on the part of the defendant, he was free to withdraw at
any time. It seems quite clear that a contrary result would be reached under the Code.
Viewed commercially, the writing contains the implicit undertaking of the plaintiff to
purchase his requirements and to proceed in good faith in selling in the area. See sec-
tion 2-306.
Barnes v. Patrick, 176 Wash. 142, 28 P.2d 293 (1934) dealt with a document titled
"Warehouse Purchase" which contained an offer of the warehouseman to purchase, but
no offer of the depositor to sell. This was held to be a bailment, a result which would
be reached under the Code because the usages demonstrated that such documents ripen
into sales only on demand by the depositor for payment.
In Larkins v. St. Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co., 35 Wn.2d 711, 214 P.2d 700 (1950),
a license to the plaintiff to remove scrap did not imply a promise on his part to pur-
chase any particular quantity. This result would follow under the Code, for here, un-
like Mowbray Pearson Co. v. E. H. Stanton Co., supra, applications of commercial
standards of good faith do not reveal a definite undertaking by the plaintiff.
There are three particular decisions which carry out the policy implicit in the Code.
In Geyen v. Time Oil Co., 46 Wn.2d 457, 282 P.2d 287 (1955), the court found an
implied obligation to deal exclusively in the product of a supplier, and thus a binding
contract. In Reeker v. Remour, 40 Wn.2d 519, 244 P.2d 270 (1952) a tenant agreed to
pay rent on a gallonage basis, thus creating the implied obligation to operate the sta-
tion, providing consideration for the lease. In Dement Bros. Co. v. Coon, 104 Wash.
603, 177 Pac. 354 (1919) the court rejected a contention that a writing stating only an
obligation to sell with a confirmation by the buyer lacked "mutuality." The court said
that a document stating that seller sells must carry a corresponding obligation to buy!
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This section represents the Code's substitution of commercial under-
standing for contractual concepts, in that the definition of "firm offer"
stated is the definition understood by business men,"7 though it has
also been judicially recognized. 8 Within the detailed limits stated in
the section, the Code rejects the general common law rule, and the
rule in Washington, 9 that an offer not supported by consideration is
revocable prior to acceptance. This will mean that a written offer
looking forward to the sale of goods by a merchant will be treated
differently from an offer to sell land."° For example, a written offer
by a car dealer to sell a car, his favorite shot gun, and his farm, con-
taining assurances that it will remain outstanding for 30 days, would
presumably not be revocable as to the car, but would be revocable as
to the land and the shot gun, for the offeror is not a mechant of shot-
guns.2 Though this bifurcation of various kinds of contracts seems
cumbersome and unreal, one may safely predict that eventually it will
be as habitually accepted as present distinct treatments given sales
transactions such as in the Statute of Frauds."
Section 2-206. Offer and Acceptance in Formation of Contract.
(1) Unless otherwise unambiguously indicated by the language or
circumstances
(a) an offer to make a contract shall be construed as inviting
acceptance in any manner and by any medium reasonable
in the circumstances;
(b) an order or other offer to buy goods for prompt or current
shipment shall be construed as inviting acceptance either
by a prompt promise to ship or by the prompt or current
shipment of conforming or non-conforming goods, but such
a shipment of non-conforming goods does not constitute
17 Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code-Sales; Should It Be Enacted?, 59 YALE
Ij. 821 (1950).
Is Alleghany Corp. v. James Foundation, Inc., 115 F. Supp. 282, 285 (D. C. N. Y.,
1953). This term has also been used by the Washington court. St. Paul & Tacoma
Lumber Co. v. Fox, 26 Wn.2d 109, 173 P.2d 194 (1946).
10 Shattuck, Cdntracts in Washington, 1937-1957, 34 WAsH. L. Rav. 24, 42 (1959);
(but of course an option cannot be withdrawn after acceptance). Lasswell v. Anderson,
127 Wash. 591, 221 Pac. 300 (1923) ; Sussman v. Gustav, 109 Wash. 459, 186 Pac. 882
(1920) ; Baker v. Shaw, 68 Wash. 99, 122 Pac. 611 (1912). If a binding option is cre-
ated, it will not be defeated for failure to include a specific undertaking not to revoke.
Hopkins v. Barlin, 31 Wn.2d 260, 196 P.2d 347 (1948).
20 A matter which can be solved by adoption of a Uniform Written Obligations Act.
Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63.HARv. L.
Rav. 561, 577 (1950).
21 Section 2-104.
2 2 Corbin, supra note 17.
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an acceptance if the seller seasonably notifies the buyer
that the shipment is offered only as an accommodation to
the buyer.
(2) Where the beginning of a requested performance is a reasonable
mode of acceptance an offeror who is not notified of acceptance
within a reasonable time may treat the offer as having lapsed
before acceptance.
The offeror under existing law23 and under the Code is in control of
his offer and may thus stipulate the permissible method of acceptance.
Absent such a stipulation, the Code takes the currently accepted ap-
proach that, so far as means of communication are involved, any appro-
priate means reasonable in the circumstances may be used.24 The
offeree need not take pains to use the same communications device
selected for transmittal of the offer. 5
The iconoclastic provision of the section, however, is that permitting
an offer to buy goods for prompt shipment to be accepted by a "prompt"
promise to ship.26 The converse of this is doctrinal, that an offeree may
when offered a bilateral contract accept it by full performance without
making a promise." Tender of full performance by the offeree obvi-
ously gives the offeror the assurance of performance he sought in solicit-
ing a promise, but what justification can there be for requiring the
offeror to accept a promise instead of the act he requested? This is
merely another illustration of the policy of the Code not to frustrate
commercial arrangements on a technicality, but to accommodate the
law to the understanding of business men. Commercial good faith
is at the heart of this matter, in that: (a) an offeror cannot word his
offer so as to make ambiguous the means of acceptance in the hope of
23 Wax v. Northwest Seed Co., 189 Wash. 212, 64 P.2d 513 (1937) ; RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS § 61 (1932).24 See RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 66 (1932). It seems pretty clear that if an accept-
able method of communication is selected by the offeree, the contract is made on dis-
patch thereof. Contra, Berman, Creation of Contracts Under the Uniform Commercial
Code, 13 U. PITT. L. REv. 750 (1952).
25 Section 205, official comment 1.
26 This has been read to mean a "prompt promise to ship promptly." Williston, supra
note 20, at 577. This seems to mean "as promptly as possible" under the circumstances.
Meyer Bros. Drug Co. v. Callison, 120 Wash. 378, 207 Pac. 683 (1922).
27 Simms v. Ervin, 46 Wn.2d 417, 282 P.2d 291 (1955) (Cf., Shattuck, supra note
19, at 43). Pillsbury Flour Mills, Inc., v. Independent Bakery, Inc., 165 Wash. 360,
5 P.2d 517, 8 P.2d 430, 10 P.2d 975 (1932) ; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 63 (1932) ;
Cook v. Story, 89 Wash. 109, 154 Pac. 147, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 985 (1916) is distin-
guishable, for there although the seller undertook performance, he made it quite clear
he was rejecting the deal proposed.
28 HAWKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES (UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE)
5 (1958).
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outwitting the offeree by insisting on a contract or denying it depending
on market change (b) a seller cannot ship non-conforming goods in
the hope that the buyer will accept them as complying, thus under the
contract, or reject them, in which case the seller attempts to argue that
his shipment was an unaccepted counterproposal resulting in no con-
tract.
This policy seems to underlie the decision in Hill's, Inc. v. William
B. Kessler, Inc." where the seller on receipt of an order wrote, "You
may be assured of our very best attention to this order." These words
were held to indicate something more than that the seller would give
careful consideration to the order and the desirability of accepting it;
they suggest that the seller will use care in filling it. Participants in
commercial deals may not "run with the Hare and holde with the
Hounde."
There is a Washington decision, 0 not involving the sale of goods
and not thus within article 2 of the Code, which found a contract result-
ing from an offeree's promising to perform instead of performing the
act requested, thus following out the policy set by the Code.
Subsection (2) also embodies the concept of commercial fair dealing
by requiring an offeree who starts performance to give reasonable notice
of that fact, thus precluding his present power to continue or cease that
performance at his whim, though the offer has thus been made irre-
vocable.81
Section 2-207. Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation.
(1) A definite and seasonable expression of acceptance or a written
confirmation which is sent within a reasonable time operates as
an acceptance even though it states terms additional to or differ-
ent from those offered or agreed upon, unless acceptance is
expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or differ-
ent terms.
29 41 Wn.2d 42,-246 P2&19 (1952).
30 Cook v. Johnson, 37-Wn.2d 19, 221 P.2d 525 (1950). Professor Shattuck's criti-
cism of this case (supra note 19, at 43) does not suggest that the codification of the
principle in the law of sales of goods is improper. See his comments on the Code else-
where in this issue of the Recvew.
31 Coleman v. Davies, 39 Wn.2d 312, 235 P.2d 199 (1951) (where the seller may
have been attempting to do just what the Code precludes). The outcome of Excelsior
Knitting Mills, Inc. v. Bush, 38 Wn.2d 876, 233 P.2d 847 (1951) would be changed by
the Code, for there although the seller wrote that it had placed the order "in work," it
also asked for confirmation of the order, which was not forthcoming. DeBritz v. Sylvia,
21 Wn.2d 317, 150 P.2d 978 (1944) ; RESTATEMENT, CONTRAcrs § 45 (1932) ; HAWK-
LAND, op. cit. sUpra note 28, at 7; Whitney, Some Effects of the Uniform Commercial
Code on New York Law-Contracts, 26 ST. JoHaN's L. Rav. 3, 10 (1951).
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(2) The additional terms -are to be construed as proposals for addi-
tion to the contract. Between merchants such terms become part
of the contract unless:
(a) the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the
offer;
(b) they materially alter it; or
(c) notification of objection to them has already been given
or is given within a reasonable time after notice of them
is received.
(3) Conduct by both parties which recognizes the existence of a
contract is sufficient to establish a contract for sale although
the writings of the parties do not otherwise establish a contract.
In such case the terms of the particular contract consist of those
terms on which the writings of the parties agree, together with
any supplementary terms incorporated under any other provi-
sions of this Act.
The current "black letter law" is:
The acceptance of an offer is always required to be identical with the
offer, or there is no meeting of the minds and no contract .... An
expression of assent that changes the terms of the offer in any ma-
terial respect may be operative as a counteroffer; but it is not an accept-
ance and consummates no contract .... s2
This principle will be erased or at least faded into a shade of gray by
the above quoted provisions of the Code. The significance and effect
of this section can possibly best be illustrated by trying to apply it to
the facts of decided cases."
32 Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. v. Fox Sheet Metal Co., 156 Wash. Dec. 165, 351
P.2d 516 (1960) ; Blue Mountain Constr. Co. v. Grant County School Dist., 49 Wn.2d
685, 688, 306 P.2d 209 (1957) ; see Shattuck, supra note 19, at 45.
s3The available cases are quite numerous. St. Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co. v. Fox,
26 Wn.2d 109, 173 P.2d 194 (1946) ; Pearce v. Dulien Steel Prods., Inc., 14 Wn.2d 132,
127 P.2d 271 (1942) ; Martinson v. Carter, 190 Wash. 502, 68 P.2d 1027 (1937) ; Pen-
nington & Co. v. Hedlund Box & Shingle Co., 116 Wash. 292, 199 Pac. 235 (1921);
L. Teweles Seed Co. v. Fairbanks, 114 Wash. 321, 195 Pac. 40 (1921) ; Empson Pack-
ing Co. v. Lamb-Davis Lumber Co., 112 Wash. 75, 191 Pac. 833 (1920); Schulze v.
General Elec. Co., 108 Wash. 401, 184 Pac. 342 (1919) ; Jones-Scott Co. v. Ellensburg
Milling Co., 108 Wash. 73, 183 Pac. 113 (1919); Chinook Lumber & Shingle Co. v.
McLane Lumber & Shingle Co., 107 Wash. 587, 182 Pac. 625 (1919); Richardton
Roller Mills v. Miller, 99 Wash. 654, 170 Pac. 357 (1918); Loewi v. Long, 76 Wash.
480, 136 Pac. 673 (1913) ; Wisconsin Lumber Co. v. Pacific Tank & Silo Co., 76 Wash.
452, 136 Pac. 691 (1913) ; Nelson v. Imperial Trading Co., 69 Wash. 442, 125 Pac.
777 (1912).
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In L. Teweles Seed Co, v Fairbanksi34 an exchange of communica-
tions ran something like this:
(1) Seller to Buyer: "For immediate telegraphic acceptance offer
sell two cars choice stock Canadian yellows five three quarters F.O.B.
cars here certified weights immediate shipment."
(2) Buyer to Seller: "Five fifty most can pay."
(3) Seller to Buyer: "We accept five and half F.O.B. cars Seattle
Canadian yellow peas providing you accept three cars about forty tons
each immediate shipment from Seattle certified weights usual terms.
Wire reply quick."
(4) Buyer to Seller: "We booked the three cars. Be sure quality
is satisfactory. If any more to offer advise."
(5) Seller to Buyer: "CONTRACT CONFIRMATION, We con-
firm sale to you today of 3 cars Canadian yellow peas at 5/ 2 0 per
pound, F.O.B. Seattle for immediate shipment, weights certified. Pay-
ment demand draft against bills of lading. Remarks: Peas to be good
stock in good merchantable condition."
(6) Buyer wrote: "Accepted, Buyer" on the above confirmation.
To be observed in the above exchange is the fact that in (1) the
seller offers choice Canadian yellow peas, but that word "choice" does
not subsequently appear. Then, in (5) payment terms are introduced.
It would seem that under the Code, as well as under current law, the
"contract" between the parties is as stated in (5) as "accepted" in (6).
Even if we assume that a contract had been reached before that docu-
ment was signed, such contract could be modified certainly so long as
both parties undertook different obligations35 which seems to be the
case.
But suppose Buyer had not signed the confirmation? Then it would
appear that if an enforceable agreement can be made out of the ex-
change of wires prior to the "confirmation," the contract between the
parties would be on those terms, new terms stated in the confirmation
being treated as proposals for additions, effective between merchants
unless (a) they materially alter the agreement," or (b) buyer gives
reasonable notice of objection thereto. The provision for payment would
seem not to "materially alter," but difficulty can be anticipated as to
whether the bargain requires seller to provide choice peas.
34 114 Wash. 321, 195 Pac. 40 (1921).
35 This point will be discussed in connection with section 2-209.
s3 "The test as to whether additional terms 'materially alter' the bargain is whether
they would normally occasion surprise to a merchant in that line of business." Whitney,
supra note 31, at 6.
1960]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
In St. Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co. v Fox, 7 a dispute about a deal
to purchase shares of stock reached the court. One should note imme-
diately that article 2 would have no impact on such a transaction, for
investment securities are controlled by article 8 of the Code. Basically,
the facts showed a lengthy and detailed offer by seller, though requir-
ing some "adjustments" in assets to determine the ultimate price, to sell
his stock, responded to by a letter from the buyer which made an inter-
pretation of one aspect of the offer which added something not included
in the offer, but which then stated: "This is to advise you that [buyer]
... accepts your offer." The holding of the case was that no contract
resulted because of the addition of the new term. One would predict
that, under the Code (assuming applicability of the sales article) a
contract could be found to exist, not including the added term, unless
assented to by the seller.
Finally, in Pearce v. Dulien Steel Prods., Inc.,8 the buyer offered to
purchase rail and angle bars at $15.00 per gross ton, and seller count-
ered with an offer at $17.50, to which buyer replied (referring specifi-
cally to the counterproposal), "please be advised that we will purchase
from you two carloads of No. 1 70-pound relay rail at $17.50 per gross
ton. Hunt will inspect this rail for our customer and will probably
designate rail to be rejected or accepted." Buyer contended that a con-
tract resulted even under present law, because his addition of the
request for inspection was of no import, since he had that right anyway.
The holding, though, was that he had no such right to have Hunt in-
spect, and thus he had made a new offer, never accepted.
How under the Code? It seems clear that a contract resulted, without
the provision for Hunt's inspection at least. It would seem that this
provision would not become a part of the bargain, however, unless
the seller assented to it. But observe two succinct points made by Pro-
fessor William D. Hawkland:
(1) Where the parties are merchants.., and the offeree "accepts"
the offer but adds terms to it, the offeror should promptly object in
writing to all of the added terms he finds unsatisfactory. Non-merchant
offerors are held to a lesser standard, and they would not have to make
this objection to assure themselves that the contract accorded with the
terms of their offer; (2) If the offeree is not willing to be bound to
a contract consisting of all the terms of the offer, he should reject the
offer prior to making a counter offer.39
3726 Wn.2d 109, 173 P.2d 194 (1946).
38 14 Wn.2d 132, 127 P.2d 271 (1942).
39 HAWKLAND, op. cit. supra note 28, at 10.
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Section 2-208. Course of Performance or Practical Construction.
(1) Where the contract for sale involves repeated occasions for per-
formance by either party with knowledge of the nature of the
performance and opportunity for objection to it by the other,
any course of performance accepted or acquiesced in without
objection shall be relevant to determine the meaning of the
agreement.
(2) The express terms of the agreement and any such course of'
performance, as well as any course of dealing and usage of
trade, shall be construed whenever reasonable as consistent
with each other; but when such construction is unreasonable,
express terms shall control course of performance and course
of performance shall control both course of dealing and usage
of trade (Section 1-205).
(3) Subject to the provisions of the next section on modification
and waiver, such course of performance shall be relevant to
show a waiver or modificaiton of any term inconsistent with
such course of performance.
Both with respect to the practical construction of contracts for sale
placed thereon by the parties,4 0 and with respect to usage of the trade,1
this section seems to state the present Washington law. Though the
Washington court has addressed itself to the point that one instance
40 Randall v. Tradewell Stores, Inc., 21 Wn.2d 742, 153 P.2d 286 (1944) ; Webb-
McDonald Tractor & Equip. Co. v. Goodfellow Bros., Inc., 182 Wash. 431, 47 P.2d 30
(1935) ; McElroy v. Andrews, 178 Wash. 1, 33 P.2d 379 (1934) ; Chinook Lumber &
Shingle Co. v. McLane Lumber & Shingle Co., 107 Wash. 587, 182 Pac. 625 (1919) ;
Hughes v. Eastern Ry. & Lumber Co., 93 Wash. 558, 161 Pac. 343 (1916) ; Kanaskat
Lumber & Shingle Co. v. Cascade Timber Co., 80 Wash. 561, 142 Pac. 15 (1914) ;
Higgins v. Product Distrib. Co., 78 Wash. 551, 139 Pac. 500 (1914) ; Shattuck, Con-
tracts in Washington, 1937-1957, 34 WAsa. L. Rav. 345, 373 (1959).
41 Donald W. Lyle, Inc. v. Heidner & Co., 45 Wn.2d 806, 278 P.2d 650 (1954);
Washington Fish & Oyster Co. v. G. P. Halferty & Co., Inc., 44 Wn.2d 646, 269 P.2d
806 (1954); Williamson v. Irwin, 44 Wn.2d 373, 267 P.2d 702 (1954); Simons v.
Stokely Foods, Inc., 35 Wn.2d 920, 216 P.2d 215 (1950) ; Pearce v. Dulien Steel Prods.,
Inc., 14 Wn2d 132, 127 P.2d 271 (1942) ; Codd v. Crowley Co., 162 Wash. 650, 299
Pac. 366 (1931) ; Dalk v. Frank D. Black, Inc., 119 Wash. 368, 206 Pac. 22 (1922)
(held that a custom of a particular plant is not necessarily a general custom). Florence
Fish Co. v. Everett Packing Co., 111 Wash. 1, 188 Pac. 792 (1920) (seems to require
that the language of the contract be ambiguous before permitting use of evidence of
trade usage). Gile v. Tsutakawa, 109 Wash. 366, 187 Pac. 323 (1920) (trade meaning
may be shown even though the words are not ambiguous) ; Turlock Fruit-Juice Co. v.
Pacific & Puget Sound Bottling Co., 71 Wash. 128, 127 Pac. 842 (1912). On the issue
of whether evidence of custom is admissible where the contract is not ambiguous, see
Shattuck, supra note 40, at 385 (1959) ; Vold, Usage of Trade and Course of Dealing
in the American Law of Sales, 1958 J. Bus. LAw 103.
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will not constitute a demonstrated usage, 2 it does not seem to have had
occasion to recognize the principle stated in subjection (1) that only
repeated occasions for performance and not a single instance are rele-
vant. The significance of parties' conduct which does not constitute a
series of performances is covered elsewhere in the Code, such as those
sections dealing with acceptance.43
Section 2-209. Modification, Rescission and Waiver.
(1) An agreement modifying a contract within this Article needs
no consideration to be binding.
(2) A signed agreement which excludes modification or rescission
except by a signed writing cannot be otherwise modified or re-
scinded, but except as between merchants such a requirement
on a form supplied by the merchant must be separately signed
by the other party.
(3) The requirements of the statute of frauds section of this Article
(Section 2-201) must be satisfied if the contract as modified
is within its provisions.
(4) Although an attempt at modification or rescission does not
satisfy the requirements of subsection (2) or (3) it can oper-
ate as a waiver.
(5) A party who has made a waiver affecting an executory portion
of the contract may retract the waiver by reasonable notifica-
tion received by the other party that strict performance will
be required of any term waived, unless the retraction would
be unjust in view of a material change of position in reliance
on the waiver.
Subsection (1) will be a reversal of the common law of most juris-
dictions which find the concept of pre-existing obligation a bar to
efforts to modify or rescind agreements absent consideration. The
status of the law on this matter in Washington is unclear," with some
42 Seattle Flower & Bulb Co., Inc. v. E. S. Burgan & Sons, Inc., 44 Wn.2d 872, 271
P.2d 704 (1954) ; Kelly-Springfield Tire Co. v. True's Oil Co., 29 Wn.2d 8, 184 P.2d
827 (1947) (the document expressly excluded any application of trade customs) ; Dalk
v. Frank D. Black, Inc., supra note 41. Where the parties are strangers to the particular
trade, they will not be deemed to have contracted with respect to it. George E. Miller
Lumber Co. v. Holden, 45 Wn.2d 237, 273 P.2d 786 (1954).
43 Section 2-208, official comment 4.
44 Shattuck, Contracts in Washington, 1937-1957, 34 WAsH. L. REv. 24, 57 (1959).
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of the decisions tending to support the policy of this subsection," oth-
ers abiding by traditional principle.4 6 The official comments to this
subsection are vitally important, for they reveal that the general re-
quirement of good faith and observance of reasonable commercial
standards'7 apply here, thus possibly requiring a demonstrated reason
for requiring or requesting the modification."'
One effect of subsection (1) will constitute a definite change in the
law of Washington, in that this subsection applies to agreements which
in fact modify prior contracts, whether or not the agreement was un-
dertaken by both parties with a design to accomplish this result.
Specifically, the doctrine now is that a warranty made after a sale is
completed is not enforceable, for it lacks consideration.49 This will no
longer be true under the Code, for the later added warranty is a modi-
fication within this subsection. 0 Presumably other subsequent changes
arrived at without extensive dickering will be similarly treated."1
Subsection (3), applying the Statute of Frauds to modifications of
contracts otherwise within its scope, probably states the prevailing
Washington law. The word "probably" is used because the Washing-
ton cases permitting parol modification of written contracts have talked
in terms of "executed contracts,15 2 and execution of the contract makes
the Code's Statute of Frauds provision inapplicable. 3
The Washington court has recognized the principles stated in sub-
45 National Ass'n of Creditors, Inc. v. Ultican, 190 Wash. 109, 66 P.2d 824 (1937) ;
Inman v. W. E. Roche Fruit Co., 162 Wash. 235, 298 Pac. 342 (1931); Wallace v.
Babcock, 93 Wash. 392, 160 Pac. 1041 (1916) ; Kiock Produce Co. v. Robertson, 90
Wash. 260, 155 Pac. 1044 (1916); Stofferan v. Depew, 79 Wash. 170, 139 Pac. 1084(1914) ; Tingley v. Fairhaven Land Co., 9 Wash. 34, 36 Pac. 1098 (1894).
6 6 Thayer v. Brady, 28 Wn.2d 767, 184 P.2d 50 (1947) ; Stauffer v. Northwestern
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 184 Wash. 431, 51 P.2d 390 (1935) ; Tacoma & E. Lumber Co. v.
Field & Co., 100 Wash. 79, 170 Pac. 360 (1918). In some of the cases raising the prob-
lem, consideration for the modification existed. Harrington v. W. E. Roche Fruit Co.,
192 Wash. 646, 74 P.2d 194 (1937) ; W. F. Jahn & Co. v. Puyallup & Sumner Fruit
Growers Canning Co., 119 Wash. 422, 205 Pac. 833 (1922); Parker v. Advance
Thresher Co., 75 Wash. 505, 135 Pac. 229 (1913).
-17 Sections 1-203 and 2-103.
is White v. T. W. Little Co., 118 Wash. 582, 204 Pac. 186 (1922).
-9 Fleenor v. Erickson, 35 Wn2d 891, 215 P.2d 885 (1950) ; Savage v. Markey Mach.
Co., 128 Wash. 433, 223 Pac. 2 (1924).
50 Section 2-313, official comment.
51 Columbia River Ice Co. v. Farris, 27 Wn.2d 636, 179 P.2d 520 (1947). The court
makes determinative the time of signing a conditional sales contract, holding that if
it were signed after the sale transaction had been completed, the transaction would be
a cash and not a conditional sale. Under the Code, the later signed agreement could
be effective as a modification.
52 Sunset Pac. Oil Co. v. Clark, 171 Wash. 165, 17 P.2d 879 (1933) ; Shell Oil Co.
v. Wright, 167 Wash. 197, 9 P.2d 106 (1932) ; Clements v. Cook, 112 Wash. 217, 191
Pac. 874 (1920).
53 Section 2-201.
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sections (4)5" and (5)." The provision of subsection (2) should be
read and reread by persons drafting instruments, and the provision
used in the contract involved in Norbom Eng'r. Co. v. A. H. Cox &
Co.5" will probably be commonplace."
Section 2-210. Delegation of Performance; Assignment of Rights.
(1) A party may perform his duty through a delegate unless other-
wise agreed or unless the other party has a substantial interest
in having his original promisor perform or control the acts re-
quired by the contract. No delegation of performance relieves
the party delegating of any duty to perform or any liability for
breach.
(2) Unless otherwise agreed all rights of either seller or buyer can
be assigned except where the assignment would materially
change the duty of the other party, or increase materially the
burden or risk imposed on him by his contract, or impair ma-
terially his chance of obtaining return performance. A right to
damages for breach of the whole contract or a right arising out
of the assignor's due performance of his entire obligation can
be assigned despite agreement otherwise.
(3) Unless the circumstances indicate the contrary a prohibition of
assignment of "the contract" is to be construed as barring only
the delegation to the assignee of the assignor's performance.
(4) An assignment of "the contract" or of "all my rights under the
contract" or an assignment in similar general terms is an assign-
ment of rights and unless the language or the circumstances
(as in an assignment for security) indicate the contrary, it is
a delegation of performance of the duties of the assignor and
its acceptance by the assignee constitutes a promise by him to
perform those duties. This promise is enforceable by either the
assignor or the other party to the original contract.
54 O'Connor v. Tesdale, 34 Wn.2d 259, 209 P.2d 274 (1949) ; Searl v. Shell Oil Co.,
172 Wash. 621, 21 P.2d 249 (1933) ; McCaw v. Advance Rumely Thresher Co., 158
Wash. 533, 291 Pac. 319 (1930).
55 Crutcher v. Scott Publishing Co., 42 Wn.2d 89, 253 P.2d 925 (1953) ; Beardslee
v. North Pac. Fin. Co., 161 Wash. 86, 296 Pac. 155 (1931) ; Lockit Cap Co. v. Glone
Mfg. Co., 158 Wash. 183, 290 Pac. 813 (1930); Yours Truly Biscuit Co. v. Chas. H.
Lilly Co., 142 Wash. 513, 253 Pac. 817 (1927); Sussman v. Gustav, 109 Wash. 459,
186 Pac. 882 (1920).
56 120 Wash. 675, 208 Pac. 87 (1922) (under no circumstances, said the contract,
will modifications be recognized unless authorized by us). One might well add, unless
authorized in writing by us.
57 See HAWKLAND, SALES AND BULK SALES (UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE) 14 (1958).
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(5) The other party may treat any assignment which delegates per-
formance as creating reasonable grounds for insecurity and may
without prejudice to his rights against the assignor demand
assurances from the assignee (Section 2-609).
The Washington decisions seem to reflect the same liberality in rec-
ognizing assignability as is represented by this section. With respect
to subsection (1), the leading case of King v.West Coast Grocery,"
specifically recognizes the delegability of the seller's undertaking in a
sale transaction, and there are decisions in cases involving contracts
other than the sale of goods in accord. 9 Subsection (5) gives to the
"other party" (that is, the non-assigning party) a protection not af-
forded by the present law. This right, of course, is in addition to the
right of action he retains against the assignor, since "delegation" of
duties does terminate the duties owed by the delegating party."0
Under the present Washington law, the assignee does not obligate
himself to perform executory portions of a contract merely by accept-
ing the assignment, so subsection (4) will alter the controlling legal
principle."' In fact, however, the Washington court has not been slow
to find an undertaking by the assignee to perform those duties, 2 so the
change will not be a substantial one.
Subsection (3) in limiting the effect of contractual inhibitions on
assignment will hasten the demonstrable trend in this direction. Early
cases stated categorically that the assignee of a contract forbidding
assignment took nothing but a claim against his assignor."3 The more
recent cases are less stringent," but they have not announced as clear-
cut a rule as the Code will provide.
Section 2-301. General Obligations of Parties.
The obligation of the seller is to transfer and deliver and that of
the buyer is to accept and pay in accordance with the contract.
58 72 Wash. 132, 129 Pac. 1081 (1913).
59 Panhandle Lumber Co. v. Mackay, 21 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1927) ; School Dist No.
15 v. People's Nat'l Bank, 13 Wn.2d 230, 124 P.2d 947 (1942)m; Fisher v. Berg 158
Wash. 176, 290 Pac. 984 (1930) ; Jenkins v. Columbia Land & Improvement Co., 13
Wash. 502, 43 Pac. 328 (1896).G0 REsTATEmENT, CONTACTS § 160(4) (1932).
61 McGill v. Baker, 147 Wash. 394, 266 Pac. 138 (1928) ; Hallidie v. Washington
Brick, Lime & Mfg. Co., 70 Wash. 80, 126 Pac. 96 (1912).02 McGill v. Baker, supra note 61.
63 Bonds-Foster Lumber Co. v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 53 Wash. 302, 101 Pac. 877
(1909).64 Erckenbrack v. Jenkins, 33 Wn2d 126, 204 P.2d 831 (1949) ; Burleson v. Blanken-
ship, 193 Wash. 547, 76 P2d 614 (1938) ; see Shattuck, Contracts in Washington, 1937-
1957, 34 WAsH. L. REv. 345 (1959). Of course, the parties may specifically contract to
allow assignment. Western Lumber Exch. v. Johnson, 110 Wash. 200, 188 Pac. 388
(1920).
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This general section is designed to cover the performance required
of the parties both as conditions precedent to the duty of the other
party's performance and as fulfillment of the duty to perform prom-
ised acts. 5 It must be read in connection with section 2-106(2) which
states the rule for determining when goods conform to the contract,
and in general retains the principle that exact performance by the seller
is required. Although the Code does not continue the present statute's
separate treatment of "conditions, 68 and "warranties,"6 the difference
in effect will remain, depending on whether the nonperformance by one
party is used to excuse the other's performance (i.e., as a condition)6"
or whether that nonperformance is sought to be made the basis of an
action for damages or other relief (i.e., as a promise)9
The official comment to this section is of particular significance, for
it directs that usage of the trade, course of dealing and performance,
and the general background and circumstances of the parties must be
given consideration in conjunction with the lay meaning of the words
used to define the scope of the obligations undertaken. This clearly
means that this factual information may be shown whether or not the
writing is "ambiguous," thus clarifying existing Washington law."
Section 2-302. Unconscionable Contract or Clause.
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause
of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was
made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may
enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscion-
able clause, or it may so limit the application of any uncon-
scionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or
any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be
afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its
commercial setting, purpose and effect to aid the court in mak-
ing the determination.
This section is obviously not intended to have precise limits; in-
stead, it is to permit the court to refuse to lend its aid to any part or
all of a contract which it deems to have been unconscionable at the
65 Official comment
66 RCW 63.04.120 (1925).
67 RCW 63.04.130 (1925).
e Barry v. Danielson, 78 Wash. 453, 139 Pac. 223 (1914).
69 Crandall Eng'r. Co. v. Winslow Marine Ry. & Shipbuilding Co., 188 Wash. 1,
61 P.2d 136, 106 A.L.R. 1457 (1936).
70 Shattuck, Contracts in Washington, 1937-1957, 34 WAsr. L. REv. 345, 369 (1959).
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time it was made. A statute in such broad terms will obviously draw
criticism;71 the argument for such an enactment is that it permits the
courts to do directly what, in the past, has been done indirectly.72
Illustrative Washington decisions, indicating what the court has
done in the past and thus may be expected to do under this section
are these:
United Fig & Date Co. v. Falkenburg," involved an effort by the
seller to escape liability for a claimed breach of a contract to sell wal-
nut meat halves by relying on this clause: "Rejection by buyer, if
accepted by seller, constitutes delivery. However when a rejection is
left uncontested by the seller or is sustained as a result of arbitration,
seller shall have the original contract period in which to tender other
lots, if he so elects." The seller had admittedly delivered unmerchant-
able nut meats, and he nonetheless contended that the buyer was obli-
gated either to accept or reject them, and in the latter case the clause
operated to make delivery complete, giving the seller (but not the
buyer) the option to tender other lots, otherwise the contract was ter-
minated. The court, in the guise of interpreting the clause, made it
inoperative, by concluding that it meant that if the buyer rejected con-
forming goods, that rejection constituted a delivery. Under the Code,
the clause could be delineated on the grounds of unconscionability.
This is not to say that any clause limiting the obligations of the
parties will be held unconscionable. In Smith v. Cadillac Motor Car
Co.,"' the manufacturer's acknowledgment of a dealer's order stated:
This order is accepted subject to delays caused by conditions of ma-
terial, fuel and labor markets, strikes, fires, transportation difficulties
and other matters beyond the control of this company, rendering the
performance of this contract commercially impracticable; it being un-
derstood that this company shall not be liable for loss or damage for
its failure to deliver goods ordered. [Emphasis added.]
This clause was recognized as a "harsh" one, but was nonetheless ef-
fective to preclude liability on the manufacturer's part for the profits
lost by the dealer caused by his loss of a sale through nonperformance
by the manufacturer. The Code does not demand a different result.75
71 See Comment, Definition and Interpretation of Unconscionable Contracts (Under
the Uniform Commercial Code), 58 DIcic. L. REv. 161 (1954) ; Note, Section 2-302 of
the Uniform Commercial Code: The Consequences of Unconscionability in Sales Con-
tracts, 63 YALE L.J. 560 (1954).72 HAwKLAND, SALES AND BuLK SALES (UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE),
22 (1958).
71 176 Wash. 122, 124, 28 P2d 287 (1934).
74 152 Wash. 131, 135, 277 Pac. 453 (1929).
75 See HAWKLAND, op. cit. supra note 72, at 24.
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
In Jones v. Mallon,76 the court upheld the validity of this clause,
insofar as it negatived warranty liability:
Purchaser agrees that he has examined the property herein de-
scribed and is using his own judgment as to its condition, fitness and
value; that the seller makes no representation, statement, warranty, or
guaranty as to its condition, or with reference to said property; that
the execution of this contract is not procured by any statement, repre-
sentation or agreement not herein contained, and that each and every
condition and agreement relative to the subject matter of this contract
is contained herein.
Yet in two cases, Los Angeles Olive Growers' Ass'n v. Pacific Grocery
Co.77 and National Grocery Co. v. Pratt-Low Preserving Co.,"8 the court
limited the effect of a clause restricting the time for making claims for
defects to ten days, by holding that such a clause applies to patent,
but not latent, defects.
The Code's provision on unconscionable provisions was intended by
its draftsmen to apply to cases like the last two cited;"9 at the same
time, however, there is nothing to require a different outcome in the
automobile case, for a later section8" permits (though limits) the use
of clauses disclaiming or limiting warranties. The court, thus, has
within its power express authority to overcome surprise and unfair
dealing, without at the same time depriving the superior bargainer of
a "hard bargain." The contribution of the Code is that it specifically
recognizes this power, and at the same time it permits the court to
hear evidence on the issue.
Section 2-303. Allocation or Division of Risks.
Where this Article allocates a risk or a burden as between the
parties "unless otherwise agreed," the agreement may not only
shift the allocation but may also divide the risk or burden.
Although there is no specific similar provision in the present statu-
tory law, the Washington court has recognized the inherent power
of parties to a contract to deal with risks to the property being dealt
with, relying on a more general provision of the present Uniform Sales
Act."
763 Wn.2d 382, 385, 101 P.2d 332 (1940).
77 119 Wash. 293, 205 Pac. 375 (1922).
78 170 Wash. 575, 17 P.2d 51 (1932).
79 The official comment refers to several similar decisions. See official comment 1.
80 Section 2-316.
81 Marks v. Kucich, 181 Wash. 73, 42 P.2d 16 (1935) (relying on RCW 63.04.720).
[Vor- 35
9 SALES AND THE U.C.C. ,
Section 2-304. Price Payable in Money, Goods, Realty or Other-
wise.
(1) The price can be made payable in money or otherwise. If it is
payable in whole or in part in goods each party is a seller of
the goods which he is to transfer.
(2) Even though all or part of the price is payable in an interest in
realty the transfer of the goods and the seller's obligations with
reference to them are subject to this Article, but not the trans-
fer of the interest in realty or the transferors obligations in con-
nection therewith.
The principal change worked by this section is its extension of the
coverage of the sales statute to exchanges of personal property for real
estate. The present statute 2 purports to exclude all aspects of such
transactions from the sales statute. This would mean that Kleeb v.
Mclnturff," which involved a swap of a stallion for land, would not
come within the Uniform Sales Act, adopted in Washington subsequent
to the particular decision. The facts of the case would be within the
operation of the new Code, however, insofar as the rights and ogliga-
tions of the parties growing out of the sale of personalty are involved. 4
Section 2-305. Open Price Term.
(1) The parties if they so intend can conclude a contract for sale
even though the price is not settled. In such a case the price
is a reasonable price at the time of delivery if
(a) nothing is said as to price; or
(b) the price is left to be agreed by the parties and they fail
to agree; or
(c) the price is to be fixed in terms of some agreed market or
other standard as set or recorded by a third person or agency
and it is not so set or recorded.
(2) A price to be fixed by the seller or by the buyer means a price
for him to fix in good faith.
(3) When a price left to be fixed otherwise than by agreement of
the parties fails to be fixed through fault of one party the other
82 RCW 63.04.100(2) and (3).
83 62 Wash. 508, 114 Pac. 184 (1911).8
- Specifically, the case involved the effect of the parol evidence rule on an alleged
warranty of the horse, a matter covered by section 2-202 of the Code.
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may at his option treat the contract as cancelled or himself fix
a reasonable price.
(4) Where, however, the parties intend not to be bound unless the
price be fixed or agreed and it is not fixed or agreed there is
no contract. In such a case the buyer must return any goods
already received or if unable so to do must 5 pay their reason-
able value at the time of delivery and the seller must return
any portion of the price paid on account.
The application of this section is entirely within the control of the
parties, for by showing explicitly that they intend to conclude a con-
tract with an open price, or on the contrary, that they do not intend
to be bound until that price is set, the parties themselves make the
statute applicable or inapplicable.8"
Insofar as sales agreements have been made without reference to a
price to be paid, under the existing statute, one must distinguish trans-
actions where the seller has executed all or a part of the transfer from
those where the agreement is entirely executory. In those cases where
the seller has delivered merchandise for which no price is stipulated,
the court has required the buyer to pay a reasonable price, usually
the market price,8" unless the contract is divisible, in which case the
buyer is obligated to pay at the contract rate.8 This result is achieved
on the basis of pure contract law, where the buyer accepts goods know-
ing the price demanded, 8 or on the basis of quasi-contract to prevent
unjust enrichment of the buyer.0"
The Code will not affect these principles, for they are recognized in
subsection (4), but the Code's treatment of executory contracts to sell
is a substantial change. The traditional view is that an agreement to
sell in the future which designates no price is not enforceable, because
it is too indefinite.8" The Code would make such a contract enforce-
able on the basis of a reasonable price.
85 So written in the 1958 official text. No doubt "must" is intended.
86 In Standard Oil Co. v. Paragon Oil Co., 82 Wash. 408, 144 Pac. 531 (1914) the
court concluded that new price arrangements were to be made effective by entering
into a new written contract. Because the new written contract was never executed, said
new terms did not become effective.
87 Reid Co. v. M-B Contracting Co., 46 Wn.2d 784, 285 P.2d 121 (1955) ; Fisher v.
Berg, 158 Wash. 176, 290 Pac. 984 (1930); Leavenworth State Bank v. Wenatchee
Valley Fruit Exch., 118 Wash. 366, 204 Pac. 8 (1922).
88 RCW 63.04.450 (1925).8 9 Koths v. Shagren, 38 Wn.2d 52, 227 P.2d 446 (1951) (buyer bound to pay for
goods received at the invoice price, for by receiving them he has assented to seller's
offer to sell at that price).
90 VOLD, SALES § 62 (2d ed. 1959).
91 Bishop v. Williams, 32 Wn.2d 50, 200 P.2d 497 (1948). Perhaps a more accurate
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Another substantial change afforded by the Code is its provision re-
specting prices to be agreed upon, or to be set by one of the parties.
The adage is that an agreement to agree is not enforceable, which
means that an executory agreement will fail entirely when it calls for
a price to be agreed upon by the parties and the parties cannot agree. 2
Under the Code, this will be enforceable on the basis of a reasonable
price where the parties fail to agree.
Finally, under settled contract doctrine, a promise by a seller to sell
at a price he would fix, or a promise by a buyer to pay a price he would
fix, will fail either because of uncertainty, or more logically because
of the "illusory" nature of the promise of the one in whose power the
determination of the price rests.9" The Code will validate such con-
tracts by removing the "illusory" nature of the promise, by reading
an obligation to set a price in good faith. A failure by the designated
party to name such a price authorizes the other to cancel the contract
or set a reasonable price. Thus, by cutting down the power of the
parties to act in bad faith, the Code expands the principle of those
cases which have recognized the validity of a contract to sell at "mar-
ket price,"'" or "posted price."9 Such prices will normally be good
faith prices within the meaning of the Code, but the absence of such
reference to standards will not invalidate an open price term.
Section 2-306. Output, Requirements and Exclusive Dealings.
(1) A term which measures the quantity by the output of the seller
or the requirements of the buyer means such actual output or
requirements as may occur in good faith, except that no quan-
tity unreasonably disproportionate to any stated estimate or in
statement of the general rule would be that an executory agreement to sell is unenforce-
able unless the price is definitely stated or made capable of definite determination. See
Mason, Article 2: Sales, 21 MONT. L. REv. 4, 12 (1959) ; 1 WILLisToN, SALES § 168
(rev. ed. 1948).
92 The Bishop case in the preceding footnote seems to make this assumption. See
Shattuck, supra note 44, at 35, 54; St. Paul & Tacoma Lumber Co. v. Fox, 26 Wn.2d
109, 173 P.2d 194 (1946).
13 See Shattuck, id. In Washington Chocolate Co. v. Canterbury Candy Makers,
Inc., 18 Wn.2d 79, 138 P.2d 195 (1943) the contract was worded in terms of a price
set at the "current price list" for a period of five years. The long duration of the con-
tract accounts for the use of an open price term, but the actual facts showed that had
a different "current market price" was used for each customer, and thus the contract
was unenforceable, insofar as it was executory.94 McGarry v. Superior Portland Cement Co., 95 Wash. 412, 163 Pac. 928 (1917)
(where the market price was actually pretty much within the seller's control).
95 Geyen v. Time Oil Co., 46 Wn.2d 457, 282 P.2d 287 (1955) ; Sunset Oil Co. v.
Vertner, 34 Wn2d 268, 208 P.2d 906 (1949) ; Searl v. Shell Oil Co., 172 Wash. 621,
21 P.2d 249 (1933). In Bearing Sales & Service, Inc. v. Isaacson Iron Works, 179
Wash. 696, 38 P.2d 398 (1934) the court held that a stipulation calling for "Special
Mfg. Prices" did not permit the buyer to set the price and allowed the seller to recover
the price he had charged, because that price was a "Special Mfg!" price.
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the absence of a stated estimate to any normal or otherwise
comparable prior output or requirements may be tendered or
demanded.
(2) A lawful agreement by either the seller or the buyer for ex-
clusive dealing in the kind of goods concerned imposes unless
otherwise agreed an obligation by the seller to use best efforts
to supply the goods and by the buyer to use best efforts to
promote their sale.
The validity of both requirements"6 and output"7 contracts has been
recognized in Washington, and good faith fluctuations in the amounts
of either requirements or output have been permitted."8 Subsection
(2) of this section would, however, clarify the complex Washington
case law. Though some decisions have validated agreements by read-
ing in a requirement of performance meeting a standard of reasonable
diligence and good faith,"9 there is always the possibility of a decision
that such undertaking will not be implied, and that the attempted con-
tract will be abortive because lacking in "mutuality."'0 ° The Code will
reduce the likelihood of this in the exclusive dealing transaction, but
this does not mean that any agreement, however loosely drawn, will
be sustained. An elaborate arrangement to run for three years, by
which buyer was obligated to take all of a product it "might desire"
is illusory,' for the buyer's apparent offer to buy is entirely depend-
ent on his whim. Thus it is not enforceable.
Section 2-307. Delivery in Single Lot or Several Lots.
Unless otherwise agreed all goods called for by a contract for
sale must be tendered in a single delivery and payment is due
96 Quist v. Zerr, 12 Wn.2d 21, 120 P.2d 539 (1941); Jones v. Shell Oil Co., 164
Wash. 543, 3 P.2d 141 (1931) ; Parks v. Elmore, 59 Wash. 584, 110 Pac. 381 (1910).
97 Holden v. Schafer Bros. Lumber & Shingle Co., 23 Wn.2d 202, 160 P.2d 537
(1945) ; Harms, Inc. v. Meade, 186 Wash. 287, 57 P2d 1052 (1936) ; Northrop-Hage
Lumber Co. v. Eureka Cedar Lumber & Shingle Co., 114 Wash. 669, 195 Pac. 1052
(1921) (though in this case, the phrase "your entire output" was restricted to include
only dried lath and not to preclude sales to third parties of green lath) ; Gardiner v.
Gyorog, 109 Wash. 660, 187 Pac. 318 (1920) ("all prime, dry, merchantable cascara
bark as (seller) shall peel, or have for sale" did not include such bark that was not
peeled or offered for sale) ; Kanasket Lumber & Shingle Co. v. Cascade Timber Co.,
80 Wash. 561, 142 Pac. 15 (1914).
98 Kanaskat Lumber & Shingle Co. v. Cascade Timber Co., supra note 97.
99 Sargent v. Drew-English, Inc., 12 Wn.2d 360, 121 P.2d 373 (1942) ; Poston v.
Western Dairy Prods. Co., 179 Wash. 73, 36 P.2d 65 (1934). An agreement to buy all
of a dairy's milk which buyer "could sell" was held to require buyer to purchase all
"which, in the exercise of reasonable diligence and ordinary good faith, it could sell."
Warner v. Channell Chem. Co., 121 Wash. 237, 208 Pac. 1104 (1922).
100 Mowbray Pearson Co. v. E. H. Stanton Co., 109 Wash. 601, 187 Pac. 370 (1920).
10 Carolene Sales Co. v. Canyon Milk Prods. Co., 122 Wash. 220, 210 Pac. 366
(1922).
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only on such tender but where the circumstances give either party
the right to make or demand delivery in lots the price if it can
be apportioned may be demanded for each lot.
The first portion of this statute, that is the twenty-seven words prior
to the word "but" states in substance the provision of the present stat-
ute,102 by which the implication is made that the contract does not
authorize installment performances. There are, of course, many con-
tracts which obviously involve installment performance, even though
the contract does not expressly so stipulate. "Requirements" contracts
and "output" contracts, previously discussed, are illustrative. A con-
tract by a sanatorium to permit a farmer to remove all edible garbage
is, quite obviously, such an arrangement. 13 A contract by one hired
to destroy a court house by which he sold the steel and iron therein
to be removed "as and when it is exposed" obviously looks forward to
piecemeal removal.10' An agreement to sell existing scrap and scrap
to be accumulated involves the same basic issue. 05
The common element in these illustrations is that the surrounding
circumstances reveal that, inherent in the undertaking is an agreement
for delivery in lots, and the new provisions of the Code recognize the
significance of these surrounding circumstances. One can readily im-
agine borderline cases where neither the contract nor the circumstances
clearly delineate whether one or several lots are visualized. The quan-
tity ordered by the buyer may, viewed with respect to his needs and
storage capacity, supply the clue. This area of uncertainty can be
obviated by express terms in the contract. For example, one should
be wary of drawing up a contract for the entire crop of potatoes, esti-
mated at 200 tons, to provide some detail as to when delivery is to be
made. A stipulation, "Delivery: When ready," is hardly adequate.'
On the other hand, a stipulation in a contract between a mail order
house and an apple grower, calling for 2500 gift boxes of apples, to
be shipped directly to customers of the mail order house, obviously
dictates installment delivery- 10
The last portion of this section, dealing with the right of a seller to
102 RCW 63.04.460(1) (1925).
103 Boyle v. King County, 46 Wn.2d 428, 282 P.2d 261 (1955).
3-04Stack v. Baird, 171 Wn2d 651, 19 P.2d 105 (1933).
105 Mason-Walsh-Atldnson-Kier Co. v. Stubblefield, 99 F.2d 735 (9th Cir. 1938).
10 6 See Irwin v. Pacific Fruit & Produce Co., 188 Wash. 572, 63 P.2d 382 (1936).
107 Foster v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 24 Wn.2d 248, 163 P.2d 838 (1945). In
Kalispell Flour Mill Co. v. Marshall, 125 Wash. 80, 215 Pac. 70 (1923), a course of
dealing was used to support a contention of the buyer that he was to receive piece-
meal delivery.
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recover for goods actually delivered, also emphasizes the need for
skilled draftsmanship. The counseling point is that if the buyer wants
to postpone his obligation to pay the price until all units have been
delivered, an express provision to that effect is desirable. This point
can best be illustrated in connection with section 2-612, to be discussed
hereafter.
Section 2-308. Absence of Specified Place for Delivery.
Unless otherwise agreed
(a) the place for delivery of goods is the seller's place of busi-
ness or if he has none his residence; but
(b) in a contract for sale of identified goods which to the
knowledge of the parties at the time of contracting are in
some other place, that place is the place for their delivery;
and
(c) documents of title may be delivered through customary
banking channels.
With the exception of subparagraph (c), this section states the sub-
stance of the present statute."' The phrase which has been most sig-
nificant in the Washington decisions has been, "Unless otherwise
agreed," and it is to be noted that the policy of those cases will con-
tinue. The policy is broad enough to find an agreement not only in
the express words used but in the surrounding circumstances." 9 One
must, however, be dubious of the continued validity of a statement
appearing on Mutual Sales Agency v. Hori,n' eliminating the effect of
a delivery provision as not controlling because it was part of the price
term. This approach would not be appropriate under the Code, for the
policy expressed in section 2-319 would seem to be relevant here. That
policy is to treat an F.O.B. term as a delivery term, even though it is
used only in connection with the price. Consequently, an expression
of a place of delivery in the price term of the contract is relevant to
the question of where delivery is to occur.
Section 2-309. Absence of Specific Time Provisions; Notice of
Termination.
(1) The time for shipment or delivery or any other action under a
contract if not provided in this Article or agreed upon shall be
a reasonable time.
108 RCW 63.04.440 (1) (1925).
109 Miles v. Pound Motor Co., 10 Wn.2d 492, 117 P.2d 179 (1941).
110 145 Wash. 236, 240, 259 Pac. 712 (1927).
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(2) Where the contract provides for successive performances but
is indefinite in duration it is valid for a reasonable time but
unless otherwise agreed my be terminated at any time by either
party.
(3) Termination of a contract by one party except on the happen-
ing of an agreed event requires that reasonable notification be
received by the other party and an agreement dispensing with
notification is invalid if its operation would be unconscionable.
Subsection (1) reading into contracts without specific time for per-
formance an obligation to perform in a reasonable time restates the
position reached in the Washington decisions."11 The analogous prob-
lem of determining when payment is to be made, absent a specifica-
tion,111 is covered by a later section of the Code." 3
Subsection (2) will provide a much needed clarification of the ex-
isting law in Washington. A contract calling for a series of perform-
ances without specified duration may be treated, under present law,
as (a) revocable at will,"' or (b) extant for a reasonable time,"51 or
subject to clarification by the use of parol evidence as to what time
limit was intended."' This latter interpretation is still possible, de-
pending on whether the document absent a time provision is an inte-
grated contract, or one intended to be the final expression of the parties'
"'I Ball v. Stokely Foods, Inc., 37 Wn2d 79, 221 P.2d 832 (1950). The contract for
delivery of peas called for delivery "when the peas are ready for harvest" Parol evi-
dence was admitted to resolve the question of what reasonable construction this should
receive. Palmer Supply Co. v. Time Oil Co., 27 Wn.2d 468, 178 P.2d 737 (1947)
(court relied on the UNiFoasx SALFS AcT, RCW 63.04.440 (2)) ; Hansen v. Wahl, 158
Wash. 34, 290 Pac. 695 (1930) (a stipulation, "date of delivery to be optional upon
return of second party from Norway," was stated to give both parties, but especially
the second party, leeway) ; Sussman v. Gustav, 109 Wash. 459, 186 Pac. 882 (1920) ;
Jones-Scott Co. v. Ellensburg Milling Co., 108 Wash. 73, 183 Pac. 113 (1919) ; Wheeler
v. Pitwood, 104 Wash. 1, 175 Pac. 289 (1918). This case holds that where no time
for delivery is stipulated, a reasonable time controls and it is error to admit discussions
prior to the execution of the contract as to a specific time of delivery. Norris-Short
o. v. Everson Mercantile Co., 103 Wash. 399, 174 Pac. 645 (1918); United Iron
Works v. Wagner, 98 Wash. 453, 167 Pac. 1107 (1917); Hoffman v. Tribune Pub-
lishing Co., 65 Wash. 467, 118 Pac. 306 (1911) (agreement to deliver "as promptly
as possible" requires delivery within a reasonable time) ; Menz Lumber Co. v. Mc-
Neeley & Co., 58 Wash. 223, 108 Pac. 621 (1910) ; Victor Safe & Lock Co. v. O'Neil,
48 Wash. 176, 93 Pac. 214 (1908).
112 Dement Bros. Co. v. Coon, 104 Wash. 603, 177 Pac. 354 (1919) (holding that
absent a specified time for payment, delivery and payment are concurrent).
I's Section 2-513.
"34 National Grocery Co. v. Santaella & Co., 160 Wash. 262, 295 Pac. 128 (1931);
Robbins v. Seattle Peerless Motor Co., 148 Wash. 197, 268 Pac. 594 (1928).
"15 Steinert, J., concurring in Randall v. Tradewell Stores, Inc., 21 Wn.2d 742, 756,
153 P.2d 286 (1944) (relying, however, on cases involving not the duration of a series
of performances, but the time for performance of a single act).
316 Randall v. Tradewell Stores, Inc., 21 Wn.2d 742, 153 P.2d 286 (1944) (noted
in 20 WAsr. L. REv. 171 (1945), and discussed by Professor Shattuck, Contracts in
Washington, 1937-1957; (pts. 2-3), 34 WAsH. L. Rt v. 345, 467 at 380, 497).
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intention."' One would anticipate that the broad policy of the Code's
creators to permit construction of contracts in the light of the entire
circumstance of the case would support the identical decision under
the Code that was reached under present law. 18
That tangled problem aside, however, the Code articulates a sound
merging of the two possible approaches to interpretation by allowing
a duration of a reasonable time, subject to cancellation by either party
on reasonable notice.
Section 2-310. Open Time for Payment or Running of Credit;
Authority to Ship Under Reservation.
Unless otherwise agreed
(a) payment is due at the time and place at which the buyer
is to receive the goods even though the place of shipment
is the place of delivery; and
(b) if the seller is authorized to send the goods he may ship
them under reservation, and may tender the documents
of title, but the buyer may inspect the goods after their
arrival before payment is due unless such inspection is in-
consistent with the terms of the contract (Section 2-513);
and
(c) if delivery is authorized and made by way of documents
of title otherwise than by subsection (b) then payment is
due at the time and place at which the buyer is to receive
the documents regardless of where the goods are to be
received; and
(d) where the seller is required or authorized to ship the goods
on credit the credit period runs from the time of ship-
ment but post-dating the invoice or delaying its dispatch
will correspondingly delay the starting of the credit period.
Paragraph (a) reflects the premise that, absent a specific provision
to the contrary, delivery and payment are concurrent acts. This has
been the effect of the Washington decisions,'19 but the statute makes
it quite plain that unless payment is to be required against documents
or "C.O.D.," the buyer has a right of inspection before he must pay.
117 Section 2-202.
118 See Note, 20 WAsH. L. REv. 171 (1945).
119 Engstrom v. Wiley, 191 F.2d 684 (9th Cir. 1951) ; Turner v. Benz Bros. & Co.,
153 Wash. 123, 279 Pac. 398 (1929) ; Dement Bros. Co. v. Coon, 104 Wash. 603, 177
Pac. 354 (1919) ; Loewi v. Long, 76 Wash. 480, 136 Pac. 673 (1913).
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This right exists under present law, 2 and is covered elsewhere by the
Code.' Situations in which the buyer does not have a right to inspect
before payment are C.O.D. transactions, C.I.F. transactions, C. & F.
transactions, and any transaction requiring payment against documents,
such as "Sight Draft, Bill of Lading Attached, Cash Against Docu-
ments."' 22 In these cases, payment is due at the time the buyer receives
the documents, under paragraph (c).
Paragraph (d), though entirely without statutory precedent, states
the obvious point that credit runs from the point of shipment, but the
seller cannot mislead the buyer as to this date by postdating an invoice.
Section 2-311. Options and Cooperation Respecting Performance.
(1) An agreement for sale which is otherwise sufficiently definite
(subsection (3) of Section 2-204) to be a contract is not made
invalid by the fact that it leaves particulars of performance to
be specified by one of the parties. Any such specification must
be made in good faith and within limits set by commercial
reasonableness.
(2) Unless otherwise agreed specifications relating to assortment of
the goods are at the buyer's option and except as otherwise
provided in subsections (1) (c) and (3) of Section 2-319 speci-
fications or arrangements relating to shipment are at the sell-
er's option.
(3) Where such specification would materially affect the other
party's performance but is not seasonably made or where one
party's cooperation is necessary to the agreed performance of
the other but is not seasonably forthcoming, the other party
in addition to all other remedies
(a) is excused from any resulting delay in his own performance;
and
(b) may also either proceed to perform in any reasonable man-
120 3 WILLIsTON, SAL-Es § 473 (rev. ed., 1948).
121 Sections 2-512 and 2-513.
122 Phalan, The Obligations of Parties to Sales of Goods Under the Uniform Com-
nercial Code, 62 Dicx. L. REv. 235, 236 (1958). Mr. Phalan cautions: "the expression
'sight draft, bill of lading attached,' without more, does not expressly require the buyer
to pay in advance of the time when the goods can be expected to arrive. The statement
is incomplete; for completeness, there should be added either (1) 'cash against docu-
ments' (or its equivalent), requiring the buyer to pay upon presentment of the docu-
ments which is usually before the goods arrive, or (2) 'inspection allowed' (or its
equivalent), permitting the buyer to wait until the time when the goods arrive (or
should have arrived, if the goods are lost in transit while risk of loss is on the buyer)."
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ner or after the time for a material part of his own perform-
ance treat the failure to specify or to cooperate as a breach
by failure to deliver or accept the goods.
The title of this subsection suggests contracts, apparently much used
in the sale of farm equipment, calling upon the buyer to give "friendly
cooperation" to the seller, or give "friendly assistance" in the rectifi-
cation of defects.12 A reading of the section, though, reveals it is de-
signed to produce results different from that aimed at by such a clause.
Although there is no obligation on the offeror to assist the offeree in
accepting, once a contract is reached there arises an obligation that
the parties will cooperate and not hinder the other's carrying forth of
his duties.' Illustrative Washington sales cases are set forth in the
footnote.'25
The Washington Supreme Court has a significant decision carrying
this principle to a desirable, yet not altogether traditional, degree.
Briefly stated, the circumstances were that the seller had agreed to
deliver title to a logging truck on a day certain, and the buyer had
agreed to pay installments of the price at designated times prior to the
day on which seller was to deliver. After the buyer had paid a sub-
stantial sum of money under the contract, he discovered for the first
time a defect in the title of the truck, in the form of a mortgage to-
ward which the seller had made no payments though he could have
done so with some of the price he received. The action was one by the
buyer to recover the price he had paid, in which he was met with the
defense that it was he who had defaulted by not completing the pay-
ments on the specified dates. The seller was, of course, relying on tra-
ditional concepts that one in default in a contract is in no position to
be awarded recovery thereon or recovery for benefit he has conferred
on the non-breacher, that is, in the language of the court, he stood pat
on his contract. Note what the court says:
123 E.g., Womach v. Case Threshing Mach. Co., 62 Wash. 661, 114 Pac. 509 (1911).
124 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 677 (rev. ed., 1936).
125 Darst v. Meduna, 15 W.2d 293, 130 P.2d 361 (1942) (seller of business to co-
operate by supplying customers) ; Church Mfg. Co. v. Joseph, 110 Wash. 110, 187 Pac.
1090 (1920) (in the sale of cider, buyer could not complain of seller's failure to deliver
where buyer had failed to provide empty barrels). In Otis Elevator Co. v. Johnson, 70
Wash. 339, 126 Pac. 894 (1912) a buyer of an elevator had cooperated sufficiently by
allowing seller to attempt to rectify defects, even though on occasions the buyer had
excluded seller from the building. These occasions were such as would have been
"inconvenient" to the buyer in operating the hotel wherein the elevator was installed.
In Davis v. Associated Fruit Co., 135 Wash. 614, 238 Pac. 629 (1925), the buyer
denied liability because the seller had failed to comply with his obligation to label
apple boxes. The seller, however, was held to have complied where he actually at-
tached labels but was forced to remove them because they were in contravention of
state law. The labels had been supplied by the buyer!
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The mores of this time and place require that a seller who has at all
times retained possession of the subject matter of the sale may not,
upon the default of the purchaser, retain the payments made by the
purchaser, if that default has been occasioned by the conduct of the
seller in refusing to co-operate with the purchaser in the usual and
customary methods and procedures by which such sales are ordinarily
effectuated and by which the interest of both parties could have been
adequately protected.
This does not put the burden of doing anything beyond the strict
requirements of his contract upon the seller if he is content with the
damages which he may sustain by the default of the purchaser, but
merely puts upon him the extracontractual obligation of common hon-
esty and fair dealing if he seeks to enrich himself substantially beyond
his actual damages by retaining the payments which the purchaser has
made.12 6
This reading into the transaction a basic requirement of commercial
honesty and good faith lies at the heart of the concept the Code dis-
plays in this particular section, and, indeed, throughout.' By bring-
ing to bear this requirement, the Code permits enforceable agreements
to leave details to the determination of one or the other of the parties.
Leaving such matters to the determination of third parties is not un-
heard of under present law,28 and within limits, the parties may de-
termine details of performance.' The effect of the Code will be to
extend those limits by applying the general requirements of commer-
cial understanding and good faith to limit the discretion of the parties
absent any other specific limitation.13 0
The statutory allocation of the option to the buyer, where specifi-
cations of the goods are involved, has support in an early Washington
120 Stewart v. Moss, 30 Wn.2d 535, 543, 192 P.24 362 (1948).
127 This concept is particularly emphasized in the sections immediately prior to this
one, sections 2-301-302.
128 W. & J. Sloane v. State, 161 Wash. 414, 297 Pac. 194 (1931) (architect's cer-
tificate final as to whether furniture complied with the contract).129 John S. Hudson, Inc. v. Power Plant Eng'r. Co., 154 Wash. 172, 281 Pac. 324
(1929) (buyer had the power to reject the goods if not satisfactory) ; Kent Lumber &
Timber Co. v. Montborne Lumber Co., 150 Wash. 377, 272 Pac. 957 (1928). The buyer
had the power to cancel the contract "on account of excessive shipping delays!' This
was held not to be an unconditional right to cancel. Jahn & Co. v. Wright, 109 Wash.
164, 186 Pac. 262 (1919) (buyer to measure using an established method of measure-
ment) ; Houser v. Atherton, 98 Wash. 386, 167 Pac. 1109 (1917) (buyer to grade the
wheat according to the State grain inspection act).
13 he reading in of a requirement of good faith in these matters is not unfamiliar
to the Washington decisional law. In John S. Hudson, Inc. v. Power Plant Eng'r. Co.,
154 Wash. 172, 281 Pac. 324 (1929) a contract calling for performance to the buyer's
satisfaction was held to a standard of good faith where the subject matter of the sale
was desirable only because of commercial value or mechanical fitness. In Gonter v.
Klaber & Co., 67 Wash. 84, 120 Pac. 533 (1912) the words "subject to inspection"
required the buyer to use his honest judgment. If he does so, his decision is final, for
the parties have so agreed. However, he may not act capriciously.
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case, 31 and is obviously designed to bring to bear what would be ordi-
nary commercial understanding in such a case. The matter may be
covered by the contract specifically, of course,'32 but the draftsmen
have done great service, for parties to contracts giving options to one
or the other are unusually adept at keeping secret where the option
lies. "3
The provision of the Code permitting the innocent party to use de-
fensively the noncompliance by the other is not new, but that portion
which allows him, on failure of the other party to delineate specifica-
tions, to perform in any reasonable manner is an addition to existing
law.
[This discussion will be continued in subsequent issues.]
131 Hurley-Mason Co. v. Stebbins, Walker & Spinning, 79 Wash. 366, 140 Pac. 381
(1914). A sale "subject to" inspection visualizes inspection by the buyer. Some of
the language of the case emphasizing the difference between conditions and warranties
may no longer be useful.
132 In Hudnall v. Pennington & Co., 136 Wash. 155, 239 Pac. 2 (1925) the contract
expressly provided that the buyer "will perform all necessary field work, will provide
all inspection, and will do all other things necessary and proper to see that the crops
herein described are properly crated and packed and prepared for market .... In an
action brought for the price of the goods, the buyer claimed they were inferior, but
the court concluded that even if so, he had only himself to blame under this clause.
:33 Chermak v. Taggares, Inc., 166 Wash. 67, 6 P.2d 380 (1931). Here the court
was moved to suggest that if the person who wrote the contract had wanted to make
ambiguous who had the option, he could not have improved on the masterpiece he
produced.
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